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FEDERAL RULE 35 HELD APPLICABLE
TO DEFENDANTS IN PERSONAL INJURY SUITS
Schlagenhauf v. Holder
379 U.S. 104 (1964)
Passengers of a Greyhound bus sued for injuries sustained when the
bus collided with the rear of a tractor-trailer. The bus company and its
driver, Schlagenhauf, were joined with the owners of the tractor-trailer
as defendants. The bus company cross-claimed against the owners of the
tractor-trailer for damages due to their negligence. The tractor company's
answer denied negligence and asserted negligence on the part of Schlagen-
hauf. It also alleged he was not "physically or mentally capable" of driving
the bus and petitioned for physical and mental examinations pursuant to
Rule 35 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' A writ of mandamus
challenging the order was denied in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
with one judge dissenting.2
The Supreme Court held 3 that rule 35 applies to defendants in per-
sonal injury actions as well as plaintiffs, and that as applied is constitu-
tional and authorized by the Rules Enabling Act.4 The Court further held
that though the person to be examined must be a party to the suit, he
need not be a party with respect to the movant; therefore, a court could
order the examination of a defendant on the motion of a co-defendant even
though there was no cross-claim between the movant and the party to be
examined.3 The Court concluded in the instant case that the examination
should not have been ordered since the movant had failed to show good
cause and to show that the mental or physical condition of the driver was
in controversy as required by the rule.6
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 (a) provides:
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit
to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made
only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party to be
examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom
it is to be made.
2 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963).
3 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964).
4 2S U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
5 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 116.
6 Id. at 119-21. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark dissented in part on
the grounds that "there was a controversy as to Schlagenhauf's mental and physical
health and that 'good cause' was shown for a physical and mental examination of
him... "' Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 122 (dissenting opinion). Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented on the basis that rule 35 should not be applied to defendants
in personal injury cases. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented because he considered mandamus
an improper remedy.
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As to whether a court has the power to subject a party to physical
or mental examination, 7 the majority of states have held that the courts
have an inherent power to order an examination of a personal injury
plaintiff to determine the extent of injury,8 while a substantial minority
have held otherwise. 9 The leading federal case prior to the adoption of
rule 35 was Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford 10 in which the Supreme Court
held that every individual has the right to the "possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law." 1 After discussing the common
law decisions, the Court ruled that the federal courts have no right or
power to order the physical examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury
suit. In a later case 12 the Court reaffirmed that there is no inherent power
to order the examination, but narrowed its earlier decision by holding that
pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act,' 3 a federal court could order a
physical examination of a party if a state statute authorized such an order.
In 1938, rule 35 was adopted to conform to the practice in a number
of states.14 The rule authorizing the federal courts to order a party to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician when the
physical or mental condition is in controversy and good cause has been
shown.' 5 The validity of this rule was tested in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,16
in which the Supreme Court held the rule constitutional as applied to a
plaintiff in a personal injury suit, and not in violation of the Rules Enabling
Act,17 which authorizes rules which do not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
7 See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2220 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
8 See, e.g., Alabama G.S. Ry. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 8 So. 90 (1890); Richmond
& D.R.R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719, 9 S.E. 602 (1889); South Bend v. Turner, 156
Ind. 418, 60 N.E. 271 (1901) ; Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan. 165, 65 Pac. 252 (1901) ;
Drake v. Bowles, 97 N.H. 474, 92 A.2d 161 (1952); Flythe v. East Carolina Coach
Co., 195 N.C. 777, 143 S.E. 865 (1928); Kresge v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175
N.E. 611 (1931) ; Carnine v. Tibbetts, 158 Ore. 21, 74 P.2d 974 (1937) ; Williams v.
Chattanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915).
9 See, e.g., Stack v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N.E. 686
(1900) ; Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Robinson, 107 Miss. 192, 65 So. 241 (1914) ; Atchison
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Melson, 40 Okla. 1, 134 Pac. 388 (1913); Austin & N.W.R.R. v.
Cluck, 97 Tex. 172, 77 S.W. 403 (1903).
10 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
1 Id. at 251.
12 Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964) provides: "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
14 See 4 Moore, Federal Practice 2552-53 (2d ed. 1963).
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a). Several states have provisions substantially similar
to the federal rule. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 35; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-357 (1962).
For a complete listing see 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure
476 (Wright ed. 1961).
16 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
1" 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
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substantive rights. The cause of action in Sibbach arose in Indiana but was
tried in an Illinois district court.
The petitioner admitted the rule to be procedural since an interpreta-
tion of the rule as substantive would result in the application of the law
of Indiana' 8 which permitted the examination of personal injury plain-
tiffs.' 9 Rather, the petitioner argued that the rule was not authorized by
the Enabling Act. She contended that the prohibition in the act against
abridging substantive rights meant no important or substantial rights could
be abridged and that the right to be free from examination was such a
right.20 This distinction was rejected by the Court, which held that since
the rule was procedural it was valid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for the dissent, conceded that the rule was procedural and that there was
no constitutional immunity from examination, but argued that the rule
represented a drastic change in the public policy which controlled the
Botsford2l decision and therefore such a change would require specific
legislation.22 Since, in the Sibbach case, the rule was conceded to be
procedural, it is arguable that the Court in the principal case placed too
much reliance on it in holding the examination to be constitutional.23
Although the most frequent use of rule 35 has been to require the
examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury suit,2 4 the question in the
principal case of whether the rule could properly be applied to the defend-
ant was a matter of first impression in the federal courts.25 The petitioner
argued that there is a constitutional right to be free from mental or physical
examination, and attempted to distinguish the Sibbach case, in that Sibbach
involved the examination of a personal injury plaintiff who had waived his
constitutional right by bringing the action.20 The Court, conceding that
some early state cases had proceeded on the waiver theory, concluded that
Sibbach was not so decided. The Court stated that even if there exists a
constitutional right to be free from mental or physical examination, it
18 Aparently on the theory that the Illinois courts would have applied Indiana law.
19 South Bend v. Turner, supra note 8.
20 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra note 16, at 11.
21 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, supra note 10.
22 Supra note 16, at 18 (dissenting opinion).
23 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., supra note 16, at 9, the Court admitted the
limitation of the case when it stated:
The contention of the petitioner, in final analysis, is that Rules 35 and 37 are
not within the mandate of Congress to this court. This is the limit of per-
missible debate, since argument touching the broader questions of Congres-
sional power and of the obligation of federal courts to apply the substantive
law of a state is foreclosed.
24 See, e.g., Little v. Howey, 32 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Gale v. National
Transp. Co., 7 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) ; Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp.,
2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942).
25 But see Dinsel v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956), in
which the court indicated its belief that it has the power in the proper case to order
the examination of an employee of the defendant, where it is contended that the
defendant was negligent in hiring the employee who caused the injury to the plaintiff.
26 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 113.
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would be untenable to say it could be waived by the seeking of redress for
injuries received through no voluntary act of the plaintiff.27
The difficulty with the petitioner's argument was in finding an express
provision in the Constitution which would prevent the examination. How-
ever, subsequent to the decision in the principal case, the Supreme Court
has struck down a state anticontraceptive law, as a violation of a federal
right to privacy.28 The Court considered this right to be underlying several
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. If such a right exists, it would
appear that it could also be violated by a rule requiring citizens to submit
to a physical or mental examination, if such rule be applied unreasonably.
However, a New Jersey statute authorizing the courts to direct any
party to the action involving parentage or identification to a blood group-
ing test,29 has been held not to violate the right of personal privacy 30
found in the state constitution.3 ' Furthermore, it was held not to violate
the privilege against self incrimination, since that privilege involved only
testimonial proof.3 2 In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
ordered a lower court to compel a child, whose paternity bad been denied
by a defendant in a paternity suit, to submit to a blood grouping test. 3
The examination was held not a violation of the due process clause of the
federal constitution or the constitutional right of privacy.3 4 These cases
are distinguishable in that they involved only blood grouping tests, which
one court was careful to point out, was "harmless and practically pain-
less." S5
It therefore appears that in order to avoid constitutional difficulties
there must be adequate safeguards built into the rule to prevent its unrea-
sonable use. Rule 35 on its face applies only to parties. This limitation
has been strictly construed for the courts have not even considered the
parents of a petitioner in a nationality suit within the rule.3 6 Furthermore
27 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 114. Moreover, the Court suggested
that to hold that a person may waive a right by exercising his right to seek federal
jurisdiction might create constitutional problems.
28 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A :83-3.
30 Cortese v. Cortese, 10 NJ. Super. 152, 76 A2d 717 (App. Div. 1950);
Anthony v. Anthony, 9 N.J. Super. 411, 74 A2d 919 (App. Div. 1950).
3' N.J. Const. art. I, 1.
32 Anthony v. Anthony, supra note 30, at 416, 74 A.2d at 921.
33 State ex re. Evertson v. Cornett, 391 P.2d 277 (Okla. 1964).
34 Id. at 280.
85 Anthony v. Anthony, supra note 30, at 417, 74 A.2d at 922. See Haynes v.
Haynes, 43 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1943), for a similar holding where a plaintiff in
an action for divorce moved for an order requiring his wife to submit to a physical
examination to determine if she were pregnant. It was held that such examination
would violate her "constitutional rights" although if and when the child was born, an
application for a blood grouping test might be entertained.
36 Dulles v. Quan Yoke Fong, 237 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fong Sik Leung
v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955); Chin Nee Deu v. Dulles, 18 F.RD. 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Yee Szet Foo v. Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). However
in Lee Wing Get v. Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), the court allowed
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an employee of a party has been held not subject to the rule. In Kropp. v.
General Dynamics Corp.,3 7 the plaintiff sued the owner of a truck for
damages for injuries sustained when he was struck by the truck. The
court held that since the driver was not a party to the suit, he could not
be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his qualifi-
cations to drive. It should be noted that the principal case differs from
Kropp only in that the driver of the bus was named by the plaintiff in
the original petition. This distinction seems artificial and has caused one
notator to suggest that the proposed amendment, which would expand the
rule to include the blood relationship of a party or an agent or person
in the custody or under the legal control of a party,38 should have been
adopted.3 9 Although this proposal has not been adopted, several states
now have such a provision.4
0
Another limitation in the rule is that the physical or mental condition
of the party to be examined must be in controversy. The meaning of this
provision has not been frequently litigated in the federal courts. Since
rule 35 is the only one of the discovery rules in which this requirement
appears, it is likely that the promulgators of the rule meant something
more to be shown than mere relevancy "to the subject matter involved in
the pending action" which is required in rule 26(b) 41 and is applicable to
all the discovery rules.42
One of the first cases under rule 35 involved the interpretation of
the "in controversy" provision.43 Defendant, who was charged with having
made certain libelous statements concerning the plaintiff's physical and
mental condition, moved for examinations of plaintiff in order to prove
truth. In holding the condition of the plaintiff not to be in controversy,
the court limited the rule to the examination of personal injury plaintiffs
who put their own condition "immediately and directly in controversy." 44
This view was promptly rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit Court
in Beach v. Beach. 45 The court approved of a blood grouping test of the
plaintiff in a paternity suit and also of the child whose paternity was in issue.
The child was a party within the meaning of the rule because he was the
a blood grouping test of the mother of the plaintiff in a nationality suit, by a
questionable reliance upon a state statute which allowed such an examination.
37 202 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Mich. 1962). See generally Note, "Physical Exami-
nation of Non-Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 43 Iowa L. Rev.
375 (1958).
38 Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts 29 (Oct. 1955), quoted in 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 3501,
at 2552 (Supp. 1964).
39 Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1024 (1961).
40 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2032 (Supp. 1964) ; Idaho R. Civ. P. 35; Minn. R. Civ.
P. 35; N.D.R. Civ. P. 35; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 35.
41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
42 Wright, Federal Cotirts 309 (1963).
43 Wadlbw'v. Humberd, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
44 Id. at 212.
45 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
real party in interest.46 The physical condition of the plaintiff and the
child were said to be in controversy because there was a conflict concerning
such condition which underlied the issue of paternity.47
After the Beach case, it was extremely difficult to determine what
meaning, if any, to attach to the "in controversy" requirement. The prin-
cipal case held that neither the good cause nor the "in controversy" stand-
ards were satisfied but did little to clarify their meaning. There was some
indication that if the movant had, through affidavits or possibly in an evi-
dentiary hearing held for that purpose, alleged specifically what he believed
wrong with the petitioner, the examination would have been allowed.4 s
Although this type of inquiry might be appropriate for the determination of
good cause, it has little relevance to whether or not the physical or mental
condition of a party is in controversy. Thus, the opinion of the Court implies
that the "in controversy" provision of the rule adds little to the requirement
that good cause be shown.
Mr. Justice Douglas,49 although conceding the rule to be constitutional,
contended that the "in controversy" requirement precludes its use on a de-
fendant in a personal injury suit. The plaintiff, by suing, puts his condition
immediately and directly in controversy, but when the rule is applied to a
defendant, the issue is whether or not he is negligent, and though his
physical or mental condition may be relevant to that issue, such condition
is not the ultimate issue. Following this reasoning, however, the physical
or mental competence of the driver would have been an ultimate issue and
the examination should have been ordered 1o since the plaintiff had charged
the owners of the bus with negligence in entrusting it to the driver.
In support of Mr. Justice Douglas' contention that the rule does not
extend to personal injury defendants, he listed several dangers inherent in
such application. Since almost every licensed driver suffers from some
ailment, a rule, which delivers the defendant to the plaintiff's doctors in
search of anything which would prove the defendant unfit to perform the
acts which resulted in the plaintiff's injury, would sanction a fishing
expedition.5 Also Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that there is the possi-
bility of blackmail; the defendant may be less likely to defend an erroneous
suit, because of the threat of submission to a physical or mental exami-
nation.52 Although these dangers are great and an unreasonable use of the
rule could even cause constitutional difficulties, they seem less formidable
in the light of the other safeguards built into the rule. The danger of a
46 Support was found for the contention that the word "party" included the real
party in interest from rule 17(a) which authorizes a party to sue in his own name
without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.
47 Beach v. Beach, supra note 45, at 482.
48 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 120.
49 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 126 (separate opinion).
50 In Harabedian v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 26, 15 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Ct.
App. 1961), it was held with little discussion that such an examination should be
ordered under a rule similar to rule 35.
51 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 125 (separate opinion).
52 Id. at 127.
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fishing expedition and the possibility of blackmail are reduced by the
requirement in the rule that the order of the court specify the scope of
the examination. Furthermore, the movant does not have an absolute right
to name the examining physician.Y3 This permits the court to appoint a
doctor who in its judgment would limit the inquiry to the issues specified,
and give a fair and accurate account of the extent of the physical or mental
defects of the person to be examined.
The rule also states that an examination can be made only on motion
for good cause shown. One court has suggested that this standard should
be strictly construed in view of the obvious danger of an invasion of the
individual's privacy by a physical or mental examination.54 If the exami-
nation is not necessary for the determination of the issues, it will not be
ordered. Thus, it was not error to refuse to order an examination where
the movant could have obtained the desired medical reports by some other
method. ,5 Similarly, where the plaintiff had previously submitted to a
physical examination, it was held not error to deny defendant's motion to
require plaintiff to produce, for the benefit of defendant, reports of plaintiff's
own physicians concerning the same injuries,56 under rule 34 providing for
production of documents on motion of any party showing "good cause
therefor." Courts are also reluctant to order an examination which would
be extremely painful,5 7 or which would endanger the health of the person
to be examined. 8
As a rule, many courts order the examination of personal injury
plaintiffs as a matter of course with very little showing of good cause.5 9
In refusing the examination in the instant case, the Court disapproved of
this procedure. The movant had alleged in his pleading that the "eyes and
vision" of the petitioner were impaired and deficient.60 A supporting
affidavit stated that the petitioner admitted having seen red lights for ten
to fifteen seconds prior to the collision, that an eye witness saw the truck
clearly for a distance of three-fourths to one-half mile, and that Schlagen-
hauf admitted having been previously involved in a similar rear end
collision.61
The Court conceded that these allegations may have given the trial
court sufficient cause to warrant an eye examination, but since there were
53 Gitto v. Societa Anonima Di Navigazione, 27 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
54 Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
55 Martin v. Tindell, 98 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1957).
36 Benning v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957).
57 Klien v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1944).
58 Strasser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 125 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
59 In Martin v. Tindell, supra note 55, at 475, the court said: "We realize that
motions for compulsory physical examinations in personal injury actions are usually
granted as a matter of course by trial judges, and that it is the common practice of
attorneys to file a perfunctory motion such as was filed here." In Leach v. Greif Bros.
Cooperage Corp,, 2 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Miss. 1942), an affidavit in support of a
motion, stating the defendant does not believe the plaintiff to be injured as severely
as he contends, was held sufficient.
60 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 120.
41 Ibid.
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not specific allegations in the pleadings or affidavits to "afford a basis for
belief" that there was any other physical or mental defects, none of the
examinations would be approved, and the case was remanded to the district
court to reconsider in the light of the guidelines set forth.t 2
It is difficult to determine from the opinion what these guidelines are.
In some cases an evidentiary hearing may be required, but it is not clear
what types of cases will require such a hearing or how much evidence would
be considered thereat. The lower court's opinion in this case suggested one
test, i.e., the movant should be required to show (1) the probability that
the adverse party's condition is relevant and proximate in point of time to
the issues of the case, and (2) good cause to believe the exarhination would
best serve to ascertain the truth and no other means of discovery would
be as satisfactory in that regard, but with due regard to the party's interest
in personal privacy. This test involves a balancing between the need for
the examination in each case, and the party's interest in privacy.63 Thus, a
court would be more likely to allow an examination where it is necessary
to determine an ultimate issue in the case. Also the degree to which the
particular examination would be susceptible to abuse should be considered.
For example, the threat of a mental examination would be more likely -to
deter a defendant from opposing an erroneous claim than would the threat
of an eye examination. Therefore, it would be proper to require more
cause to be shown before a mental examination is ordered than for an eye
examination.
In conclusion, there are more dangers involved in the application of
rule 35 to defendants than to plaintiffs, including an unreasonable invasion
of a party's personal right to privacy. The Court, however, was unsuc-
cessful in providing ineaningful guidelines for the lower courts in applying
the good cause and "in controversy" requirements to avoid such dangers. It
is suggested that the test of the lower court is logically sound and should
provide a fair balance between the various interests involved.
62 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 3, at 122.
63 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, vtpra note 2, at 50.
